Can Europe police a Ukrainian peace deal?

So many questions, so few answers.

Most likely this Substack will not age well – we are all in uncharted territory and on our side of the Ukrainian frontline what Trump and his acolytes have said is not only alarming, but also confusing, and unclear, even to Europe’s leaders. What’s clear is it’s not good, but exactly how bad and how it will play out is simply unknown.

In large part this is down to the nature of Trump’s personality, which is impulsive and emotional not strategic. The oft-stated nostrum that Trump’s negotiating tactic is to keep others on the backfoot may have some truth, but it ignores the simple fact this is a reflection of his personality, not some sophisticated aspect of the art of the deal. Trump is contradictory by nature, not by design, and will switch for emotional not strategic reasons – hence everyone tip-toeing around him to avoid offending this notoriously narcissistic, thin-skinned and vindictive man who has ended up with such power at his fingertips.

In fact, when one party to any deal, Russia, is ecstatic about what’s happening, and everything that’s been said so far is undermining what’s meant to be your side, it’s fair to ask not just how this can be seen as good dealmaking but also whose side are you on.

So, where does this leave us, apart from worried and confused – a perfectly reasonable response to the US’s, but not a basis for action.

And action requires planning, and planning requires assumptions on which you can confidently build a plan which can be acted upon. Those assumptions include an agreed end state, but also, in the context of Ukraine, the details of any ceasefire, and as you are working towards those details the planners need to be engaged to give it a sanity check and ensure it’s actually deliverable.

At present none of this exists, and what we do know is not just confused and sometimes contradictory, but undermines its viability.

One thing we should not be surprised at is the US leading and then dominating negotiations. For instance the Dayton talks that produced the Bosnia peace deal in 1995 very much had the US in pole position. It’s not unreasonable to limit the number of negotiators in the negotiating room – the Russians will have one voice on their side of the table, and you don’t want a cacophony on the other side.

The break with reality comes with what happens when you leave that room, because whatever may be agreed in there then has to be enacted, and that on the basis of what little we do know not just requires Ukrainian backing but also Europe’s.

For Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of Defence, has said there will be no US involvement in any peacekeeping force, which assumes Europe’s forces will be the so-called ‘boots on the ground’. In practical terms then, if there are to be any peacekeepers then the nations expected to pony them up will need bringing onside.

And this itself is not a simple process. How many, where, with what Rules of Engagement? What does Ukraine want? Besides they would have views on troops coming in and how they’re deployed. Neither can this be done after some unilateral deal between the US & Russia, even assuming the Russians would agree to NATO nation troops being in Ukraine, which itself is a stretch.

So, the idea the US can cut a deal, slap it on the table, tell those who have to make it work to crack on, and then walk off for a celebratory McDonalds in the Oval Office is for the birds.

The latest statements from the US presenting their first talks in Saudi Arabia with the Russians as more exploratory and process-driven is perhaps a sign of realism, albeit hardly comforting. But it also moderates much of their previous language, which was aggressive in tone and content. Rubio’s tone was certainly more realistic about the way ahead, notably stating the need for a deal that would not lead to a restarted war in a couple of years. But US comments are still free of any hint of anything that would discomfit the Russians, so we shall see.

And more confusion is now being added by the US suggesting it also sees itself as having a mediation role. Really? Is America now presenting itself as some neutral party? That’s astonishing and also incoherent when we know it will use its power to leverage a deal – which is not a mediation role.

For if any realistic deal is in the offing then very quickly it will have to cease being a purely US/Russia negotiation. Even the broadest outlines of an outcome will require the buy-in of Ukraine and Europe, and for the planners to start work out how to deliver it.

That is unless of course the US would be content to present it as an ultimatum and say, ‘Here’s what you’re going to do. Do it, or else. Bye.’ The fact this could even be considered a possibility by supposed allies shows how much damage has already been done to the transatlantic alliance.

Among other factors, that relationship rested on shared values and outlooks – and trust. In different circumstances the US leading on talks with Russia would have caused less alarm if it had not been for the feeling we are being deliberately cut out, that the US no longer leads but imposes, and operates purely in line with its national not shared interests.

It’s horrible to say, but currently we cannot trust the US administration.

I personally find that very painful to say. I am someone who felt privileged to spend 16 years working directly for successive American SACEURs, as well as working alongside and closely with hundreds of other Americans, including in conflict zones.

Trustworthy or not, unless the US just says to hell with this and walks away, they will need to bring Europe and Ukraine in to gain our support for any deal because we are indispensable to making it happen.

So, what is needed to make it work?

In terms of outcomes then it’s all about a sustainable peace, which means a ceasefire that doesn’t just create a pause for Russia to re-arm and then have another go in a few years’ time. We should not kid ourselves that Russia will ever be satisfied just with retaining the parts of Ukraine they currently occupy. They want the lot, either directly through occupation or through a puppet regime.

A sustainable peace therefore rests on deterring Russia from believing it can successfully defeat Ukraine. Peace through deterrence.

That in turn can only be achieved through a combination of, first, building up Ukraine’s armed forces and, second, given Russia’s malign intent and size, enduring security guarantees. Ideally Ukraine would like that to come from NATO membership, but that’s not going to happen anytime soon, and it’s not only the US that would veto that at present.

Hence we would be looking at individual NATO nations, rather than NATO the institution, forming a coalition of the willing to provide that guarantee – not a peacekeeping but deterring.

Now the planning assumptions, and unanswered questions start mounting up alarmingly.

Given this is a substack and I can be harmlessly (if embarrassingly) wrong, let’s make a few assumptions to get us going. An open-ended ceasefire is agreed, and the frontline is frozen pretty much where it is and the Russians agree (and as I said above, this is a stretch) to a so-called ‘peacekeeping force’ which includes NATO nation forces.

Firstly, our frazzled, anxious planners will be asking what kind of force this will be.

There are a fair number of options here. Classical peacekeeping forces are often little more than ceasefire monitors, with so-called Rules of Engagement (RoEs) which only allow them to use weapons in self-defence. We saw the effect of this with UNPROFOR in Bosnia in the 90s where well-armed soldiers, many from NATO nations were effectively humiliated, watching on helplessly as the country descended into chaos and barbarity.

Then the Dayton agreement was signed and many of the same troops changed from UNPROFOR to the NATO-led IFOR, and moved to a peace enforcement role which meant they could use their weapons to enforce the deal, not just in self-defence. Virtually overnight, IFOR became as successful as UNPROFOR was not. Not only did they have permissive RoEs, but it was backed by the weight of NATO’s power.

Therefore, a peacekeeping force is a non-starter – in some form or other it will have to be a peace enforcement operation. In the context of Ukraine any peace enforcement operation against Russia is an order of magnitude many times greater than facing down Bosnian Serb militias. It should also be noted that at its peak IFOR had 54,000 troops in-country. Ukraine is both bigger and more dangerous.

So, if it is to have an enforcement mandate and RoEs, what kind of force is needed then?

For a start the language being bandied around of a Reassurance Force should be dispensed with. It’s an empty euphemism. The only way to reassure Ukraine is to deter Russia from breaching any deal. It needs to be some kind of Deterrence Force (a ‘DFOR’), not a RFOR.

Will it be deployed near the front or further back? How much of the almost 2,000 kilometre frontline should it cover. All of this will dictate the size and composition of the force. Will it be configured as some kind of tripwire force, where a Russian attack leads to some kind of bigger response? Will it have the capacity in terms of firepower and mobility to strike back in substance? How will we work with Ukraine, what are the liaison links to Russia?

So many questions. Having been a (small but closely engaged) part of NATO planning for various major operations then we need an agreed endstate and concept of operations, and right now planners have very little to go on.

Whatever it is, then it will require sophisticated operational planning to handle a large multinational force. There is really only one country, the US, and one organisation, NATO, with this kind of capacity. The US may say this won’t be a NATO operation, but if you want anything of this kind to happen at the scale needed and at speed, then you need NATO’s planning mechanism, which includes Americans working at NATO. That’s what happened with IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan.

Then, you have to get the force into theatre, and presumably at some pace. In all previous operations, much of that heavy lifting, literally and metaphorically, has been done by the US, making up for European logistic shortfalls. The US may not want combat boots on the ground, but if it wants European boots on the ground it will need to help get them in.

And once they’re in this force will need high grade Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities to see what’s going on, along with the ability to dominate the airspace above our forces and counter Russian electronic jamming. The best European forces all have some of this, but none have enough. Again, if the US want European forces in high threat areas then they will need American support, and the best way to manage this is through NATO, even if it’s not a NATO force.

And if the force’s tripwire is tripped? If it’s going to be any form of deterrent then Russian breaches of a ceasefire will need a response that prevents a repetition, and that is mostly likely going to need airpower and again the US has the best capacity to provide the all-round force packages that would be needed.

The US does need to face up to the inherent contradictions within its own public statements. It unilaterally agrees a deal with Russia, then says the Europeans must put it into effect, but they’re not going to help, even if they get into trouble. Even more, by saying they will not allow NATO Article 5 to be declared, they are positively encouraging Russia to attack them, not least to further undermine the Alliance. That’s the reverse of deterrence.

Perhaps we’re already some signs of the response from Europe. As I wrote this Keir Starmer was reiterating his willingness to put troops on the ground in Ukraine – provided there was a US backstop.

So, more questions. Can Britain actually support the operation? That of course depends on the size and nature of the force, but the uncomfortable fact is what we could provide is pretty small, and it highlights the scale of the decline of British military power.

From an army of around 70,000, what we currently promise to NATO is a single armoured division, which is about 16,000 soldiers. For comparison, the Russian operation group of forces in occupied Ukraine in mid-2024 was estimated at over 500,000. What’s more, that British division is not fully combat capable.

At best, we could perhaps supply a brigade of about 5,000, but sustaining that over time with all the necessary support will be hugely difficult and certainly mean we can’t meet our NATO commitments. Few other nations will be able to offer much more.

Of course, the aim of a Deterrent Force (DFOR) is not to end up in full-scale combat with the Russians, but to deter it is going to have to robust and capable both on the ground and in the air. The Russians also have to know that if they take it on then what follows on will hurt them – a lot.

Psychologically, the Russians are also unlikely to be deterred by European forces alone, however capable. It’s the threat of US intervention that deters. So, when Pete Hegseth told NATO that the US was not going to help enforce any ceasefire and would block NATO being involved it must have felt like all their Christmases had come at once.

None of this changes the absolute requirement for Europe to start ramping up their defence spending. However, I would reject Trump’s zero sum calculation that the US has somehow been subsidising Europe to its own cost. It may have been over-paying on defence, but it still got a good return, and the US has been a massive, perhaps the prime, beneficiary of the rules-based order its superpower status has hitherto sustained. Only a man like Trump who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing could not see that.

Be that as it may, Europe has to accept the blame for allowing its peace dividend to turn into a fire sale, and is now paying the price with this lesson on the brutal realities of power within its own backyard. The storm warning of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was not ignored, but the rise in defence spending was too little, too slow, and that continued, even after the second invasion in 2022.

No more so than in Britain. In 2014 we spent 2.1% of our GDP on defence, now it’s 2.3%. It’s risen ever so slowly but in real terms we are still spending less on defence now than we did in 2010. Now Starmer has said, "We're facing a generational challenge when it comes to national security” but the stated commitment to an increase to 2.5% of GDP is still at some future date.

If we do indeed face a generational challenge – and I think we do – then his actions need to match his words, and that means more than 2.5% in a few years’ time. It means urgent spending now on known gaps, and if we are going to fill a US void it will be 3% at least. If we are going to help Ukraine build the defences it needs to combat Russia, we need to be building up our defence industrial base – something we should have started years ago but have not.

But we are where are. Doing what needs to be done will knock a massive hole in Chancellor Rachel Reeves’ budget, but if Starmer means what he says then taking on a ‘generational challenge’ can’t be done by half measures and on the cheap.

During the end of the Cold War defence spending was at about 4%. What price our defence in this new Cold War when we can no longer rely on the US, and a US which is cosying up to Russia, asking little of them while criticising us?

So many questions, so few answers, and none of them reassuring.