Thanks for sharing your thoughts in that piece Mark.
What is missing, understandably so because nobody wants to countenance it, is a tangible sense from within the UK (and other EU) populations that we are as close to being on the verge of total war as we have been since 1945. I suspect one would have to explain what the term means.
Of course Ukraine are already experiencing this. However, nobody in Europe appears willing to accept that the war in Ukraine could possibly affect their lives, even though impact of the conflict has already raised food and fuel prices, introduced instability in energy markets and hit people's standard of living (ergo their lives) to a lesser or greater extent.
The way these issues have been articulated by communications professionals on all sides, bar the government, has been through the lens of domestic politics. The idea that a vicious war, perfectly described in your article, in eastern Europe is the reason we are all paying more at the pumps has largely been forgotten.
The existential threat facing Ukraine is barely registered by people in the street. The potential for NATO to be dragged into the conflict, through design or miscalculation - something every western leader is trying to avoid at all costs - would change the economic equation for UK overnight. The citizens of this country and of the EU would, over time, be transported back to the total war scenarios we all recognise from WW1 and WW2. The proximity of this reality has been forgotten, ignored or misunderstood. The 'pounding longer' quote comes with a hefty cost, in more than fiscal terms.
Mark, good analytical piece. The reason no-one commentated on the possible WW1 deadlock scenario is that everyone already knew the answer: fighting high-intensity conventional war with ground parity/inferiority and without at least air superiority produces deadlock. It was ridiculous for Putin to launch his invasion without an effective airforce, which everyone assumed he had, or an effective plan, which he had in 2014. This is just one more of several historical examples of someone achieving surprise by doing something so stupid it can't possibly work, e.g. Japan in December 1941. The 'laboratory' here is that Ukraine is trying to take the offensive using ground-based systems as a substitute for an airforce, so far with limited success. It is frustrating that the USAF could win this war in about 72 hours, but obviously that can't happen. Depth fire artillery/missiles attacking logistics nodes and trying to establish a favourable attrition gradient (how's that for jargon) is reminiscent of Montgomery's 'dogfight' in the middle phase of the Battle of Normandy 1944. Ukraine misplayed its propaganda war after the first few months by not keeping a high enough international profile making it easier for NATO to supply Leopards and F-16s earlier than has been politically possible.
Thanks Stephen - I'm a little more sceptical about the commentators, much though I respect many of them. When it would have been a bit more prescient I really didn't find anyone saying, this is going to be a war of attrition. They started saying it when it was a rather easier call! Remember, these are the same people who in the main predicted Russian victory.
In my case, I did believe Russia would attack in winter 2022, but didn't predict he would go for Kyiv for the very good reason I didn't believe he had the force size to achieve taking the whole country, so would limit the attack to the more achievable one of creating the land bridge to Crimea. So, if you like, I got it wrong for the right reasons!
Agree with your post. In both Putin's and Japan's case they based their policy on an appreciation of the will of their opponent, not the capabilities of the forces on both sides. The Japanese thought they could do a force majeure with a sleeping tiger after it was woken, while Putin allowed his ethnic prejudices to assume the Ukrainians were useless peasants who could be brought back into the Czarist fold.
Thanks for sharing your thoughts in that piece Mark.
What is missing, understandably so because nobody wants to countenance it, is a tangible sense from within the UK (and other EU) populations that we are as close to being on the verge of total war as we have been since 1945. I suspect one would have to explain what the term means.
Of course Ukraine are already experiencing this. However, nobody in Europe appears willing to accept that the war in Ukraine could possibly affect their lives, even though impact of the conflict has already raised food and fuel prices, introduced instability in energy markets and hit people's standard of living (ergo their lives) to a lesser or greater extent.
The way these issues have been articulated by communications professionals on all sides, bar the government, has been through the lens of domestic politics. The idea that a vicious war, perfectly described in your article, in eastern Europe is the reason we are all paying more at the pumps has largely been forgotten.
The existential threat facing Ukraine is barely registered by people in the street. The potential for NATO to be dragged into the conflict, through design or miscalculation - something every western leader is trying to avoid at all costs - would change the economic equation for UK overnight. The citizens of this country and of the EU would, over time, be transported back to the total war scenarios we all recognise from WW1 and WW2. The proximity of this reality has been forgotten, ignored or misunderstood. The 'pounding longer' quote comes with a hefty cost, in more than fiscal terms.
Thanks Ade. Agree. Most people still feel 'it can't happen here', and we have seen the consequences of that attitude before.
Mark, good analytical piece. The reason no-one commentated on the possible WW1 deadlock scenario is that everyone already knew the answer: fighting high-intensity conventional war with ground parity/inferiority and without at least air superiority produces deadlock. It was ridiculous for Putin to launch his invasion without an effective airforce, which everyone assumed he had, or an effective plan, which he had in 2014. This is just one more of several historical examples of someone achieving surprise by doing something so stupid it can't possibly work, e.g. Japan in December 1941. The 'laboratory' here is that Ukraine is trying to take the offensive using ground-based systems as a substitute for an airforce, so far with limited success. It is frustrating that the USAF could win this war in about 72 hours, but obviously that can't happen. Depth fire artillery/missiles attacking logistics nodes and trying to establish a favourable attrition gradient (how's that for jargon) is reminiscent of Montgomery's 'dogfight' in the middle phase of the Battle of Normandy 1944. Ukraine misplayed its propaganda war after the first few months by not keeping a high enough international profile making it easier for NATO to supply Leopards and F-16s earlier than has been politically possible.
Thanks Stephen - I'm a little more sceptical about the commentators, much though I respect many of them. When it would have been a bit more prescient I really didn't find anyone saying, this is going to be a war of attrition. They started saying it when it was a rather easier call! Remember, these are the same people who in the main predicted Russian victory.
In my case, I did believe Russia would attack in winter 2022, but didn't predict he would go for Kyiv for the very good reason I didn't believe he had the force size to achieve taking the whole country, so would limit the attack to the more achievable one of creating the land bridge to Crimea. So, if you like, I got it wrong for the right reasons!
Agree with your post. In both Putin's and Japan's case they based their policy on an appreciation of the will of their opponent, not the capabilities of the forces on both sides. The Japanese thought they could do a force majeure with a sleeping tiger after it was woken, while Putin allowed his ethnic prejudices to assume the Ukrainians were useless peasants who could be brought back into the Czarist fold.